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he term Finlandisation has dropped out of current diplomatic usage, since Finland has 
long since quit this state of affairs and Russia is not the Soviet Union. But still the term 
has stuck in the terminology of international relations texts with a distinct meaning:  
generically, a small state that acquiesces in the hard security sphere of influence of an 
authoritarian and hegemonic neighbour, while belonging at the same time to the liberal 
democratic and economic regime of the West. For me the term sprung to life again when talking 
to a civil society leader from Belarus in Prague in the margins of the Eastern Partnership summit 
of 7 May. I asked him what he made of Belarus joining the Eastern Partnership, with Moscow’s 
apparent non-objection. He replied: “We have the impression that Moscow has come to see a 
certain Finlandisation of Belarus as unavoidable and even useful.” For Belarus, neo-
Finlandisation means remaining in Moscow’s orbit for strategic security affairs (strategic 
military installations, 50% ownership of the gas pipeline, no question of NATO aspirations), but 
becoming more open to its EU neighbours for personal contacts and eventual political 
liberalisation and for modernising its economy. All this has the ring of plausibility to it.   
How does this syndrome look further to the East? And is it likely to be a sustainable and stable 
formula? For example, in Moldova (Transnistria) and Armenia, the Russian military is present 
alongside its energy networks, neither has NATO membership aspirations, while both countries 
seek at the same time to gradually Europeanise. Ukraine hosts the Russian Black Sea fleet, due 
to be evacuated in 2017, but Foreign Minister Lavrov says that Russia wants to extend its lease 
there. Overall the strategic landscape becomes clearer: none of the six Eastern partners has a 
credible membership prospect for either the EU or NATO on the political horizon, the Russian 
strategic presence is sustained or growing throughout the region, and all countries seek political 
and economic ‘Europeanisation’ in varying degrees.  
Is this a recipe for the stability of the wider Europe, or a recipe for a remake of the notorious 
instability of the buffer zones of European history? The Eastern Partnership was discussed 
explicitly at the EU-Russia summit in Khabarovsk on 22 May. The EU side argued that the 
Eastern Partnership was positive all round and was against no-one, although it was evidently 
spurred on by the August war in Georgia. President Medvedev said: “They did try to convince 
me, but they did not completely succeed”.  
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Russki realpolitik and hard power sits alongside EU soft power and liberal democratic values. It 
is one thing for these two very different animals to be realistic, responsible and mutually 
interdependent neighbours bilaterally – a plausibly stable proposition. But what happens when 
their respective presences co-habit in this buffer zone, whose states seem condemned to manage 
constant ambiguities in their political stances and to face constantly contradictory pressures?  
The Finnish Finlandisation was stable and mutually beneficial for some decades, and then 
dissolved itself quietly and completely. But can the Eastern neighbours manage their affairs as 
smoothly? Only a naïve optimist could assume this. There are not only the risks of 
miscalculation and misunderstanding attached to the ambiguities and contradictions of such 
regimes. We saw these risks actually mutate into a short but dreadful war in Georgia last 
August.  
Today the risks inherent in the confusions and ambiguities of Ukraine’s relations with the EU 
and Russia are still just risks. But the political symbolism on display in Prague and Khabarovsk 
this month was not reassuring. What is clear is that neither the EU nor Russia is going to quit 
their overlapping neighbourhood, the EU gently encouraging political and economic 
Europeanisation, Russia seeking to consolidate its strategic security interests.     
Are the two sets of leadership capable of achieving some more sincere convergence on some 
common European space, house, home, order or architecture? They seem already to have used 
every conceivable image as labels for a box that remains largely empty. For example, the EU 
finds President Medvedev’s pleas for a new security architecture to be lacking in conceptual 
coherence and operational content. Russia dismisses the European Energy Charter, etc.  
What should they do? The Eastern Partnership offers some ad hoc participation maybe by third 
parties such as Russia and Turkey, but this is marginal tokenism. Something more substantial 
and balanced between all major parties is needed. Last month we published ideas for some 
major projects that could bring together the EU, Russia, the Eastern partners and Central Asia. 
Let us add now another idea. Why not initiate a triangular EU-Russian-Ukrainian political 
dialogue, with all three as equal partners? Let it begin with an open search for confidence-
building measures between the parties, together with discussion of urgent topics such as gas 
supply security. 
 